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THE IMPACT OF THE NEW BANKRUPTCY CODE
ON THE "BANKRUPTCY OUT" IN LEGAL
OPINIONS*
ROBERT J. HARTER, JR.**
KENNETH N. KLEE***
A legal opinion' is often an essential part of an agreement for the sale
of property or the creation of an obligation.2  One party to a
transaction will customarily demand an opinion from the other party's
lawyer stating that the agreement is "valid, binding, and enforceable
in accordance with its terms"-an enforceability opinion. 3 But while
an obligation may remain "valid" and "binding," a party may be
released from performance, or may otherwise have the enforceability
of the obligation drastically limited, by its subsequent bankruptcy and
by the actions of the trustee in bankruptcy. As a result, an enforce-
ability opinion is usually qualified by the proviso "except as enforce-
ability may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization or
similar laws affecting the rights of creditors generally"--the "bank-
ruptcy out."'4 This limitation on the scope of the enforceability opinion
is particularly important if the language "enforceable in accordance
with its terms" is taken to mean that the agreement is specifically
enforceable by the party to whom the opinion is addressed. 5
* © Robert J. Harter, Jr. and Kenneth N. Klee 1979.
** Member of the California Bar.
*** Shutan & Trost, P.C., Los Angeles, California. Mr. Klee was one of the principal
draftsmen of the new Bankruptcy Code.
1. The kind of legal opinions discussed in this article have been described as "opinions of
counsel rendered as the result of contractual obligations of the client to provide a favorable
opinion as a condition to the obligation of the other party to the contract, or as is sometimes the
case to opinions rendered to the client (in almost all cases the upperdog-underwriter, lender,
buyer; the one with the money) which is still a condition of the client to proceed with the deal."
Bermant, The Role of the Opinion of Counsel: A Tentative Reevaluation, 49 Cal. St. B.J. 132,
137 n.5 (1974).
2. "[Llegal opinions are almost always required as a condition precedent to the closing of the
transaction." Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions-An Attempt to Bring Some Order
out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. Law. 915, 915 (1973).
3. For examples of legal opinions and discussions of the considerations involved in drafting
them, see Special Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, Legal Opinions to
Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 Bus. Law. 1891 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Legal Opinions to
Third Parties], and two model opinions prepared by the Subcommittee on Opinion Writing of the
Massachusetts Bar Association Committee on Corporate, Banking and Business Law, Omnibus
Opinion for Use in Loan Transqctions, 60 Mass. L.Q. 193 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Loan
Transactions Opinion], and Omnibus Opinion for Use by Seller's Counsel in the Sale of a
Closely-Held Business, 61 Mass. L.Q. 108 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Closel'-Held Business
Opinion].
4. See Legal Opinions to Third Parties, supra note 3, at 1917, 1926; Loan Transactions
Opinion, supra note 3, at 199-200; Closely-Held Business Opinion, supra note 3. at 116.
5. There is some controversy over the necessity for the bankruptcy out in legal opinions. One
277
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
The traditional understanding of the bankruptcy out as a qual-
ification which "relates to the availabilitv of remedies and the collecti-
bility of debt ' 6 clearly limits the enforceability opinion by excluding
from its scope a wide range of the effects of bankruptcy under the new
Bankruptcy Code (the Code). 7 For example, the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy acts as an automatic stay preventing the commencement or
continuation of lien enforcement proceedings, as well as other lawsuits,
against the debtor and his property.8 Executory contracts, including
unexpired leases of real property, may be rejected by the trustee in
bankruptcy, leaving the unsecured creditor or lessor with a claim for
view is that the bankruptcy out is unnecessary because the scope of the enforceability opinion Is
not broad enough to include advice as to the impact of bankruptcy. Proponents of this position
point out that the enforceability opinion is not an "extended opinion [containing] words such as 'in
bankruptcy', 'against third parties' or 'specifically enforceable.' " Babb, Barnes, Gordon &
Kjellenberg, Legal Opinions to Third Parties in Corporate Transactions, 32 Bus. Law. 553, 564
(1977). Accordingly, the enforceability opinion "does not predict the outcome of future litigation
arising out of the [a]greement [and] does not mean that it will be enforced under all circumstances
or against third parties or that any particular remedy (e.g. specific performance) will be
available." Id. From this perspective, the bankruptcy out is obviously not necessary because It Is
"(i) not properly an exception to an opinion that an agreement is valid or enforceable or
enforceable in accordance with its terms, or (ii) implied as a matter of custom, to the extent It Is
deemed an exception to any such opinion." Id. at 564-65. At the same time, adherents to this
view recommend that the phrase "enforceable in accordance with its terms" not be included In a
legal opinion. Yet the use of such language is customary. See, e.g., Legal Opinions to Third
Parties, supra note 3, at 1926; Loan Transactions Opinion, supra note 3, at 202; Closely-Held
Business Opinion, supra note 3, at 111. "The use of a general qualification as to insolvency laws
and specific performance .. . are thought, by careful counsel, to be necessary general mod-
ifications of the opinion that the various agreements . . . involved . . . are 'enforceable In
accordance with their terms.' " Loan Transactions Opinion, supra note 3, at 200 n. 16; Closely-
Held Business Opinion, supra note 3, at 116 n.53. As a result, the leading commentator on legal
opinions has espoused a better view of the bankruptcy out which recognizes that the enforceabil-
ity opinion may well convey advice which should be qualified. Fuld, supra note 2, at 930.
Characterizing "enforceable in accordance with its terms" as "probably the most controversial
phrase in legal opinions," id., Fuld suggests, three possible meanings for the language. First,
"specifically enforceable" is proposed as a fair meaning. For example, a client who contracts to
purchase a business in reliance on an enforceability opinion could reasonably expect to receive the
actual business and not simply a claim for damages. Second, the phrase may mean simply that
some, unspecified, remedy will be available in the event of a breach. Third, it may mean that
each term of the agreement is susceptible or capable of specific enforcement, but that no
prediction is made as to whether a court would actually so enforce it. "Because of the basic
uncertain meaning of the phrase . . . it is usually unwise to give an unqualified opinion that the
agreement is 'enforceable in accordance with its terms,' unless the only obligation under the
agreement is to pay money." Id. at 931.
6. Fuld, supra note 2, at 931.
7. The new Bankruptcy Code was enacted as title 11 of the United States Code. Act of Nov.
6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct. 1, 1979).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. II app. 1978). This section enjoins any act or the commencement
or continuation of an) court proceeding to enforce a lien against property of the estate. The stay
against lien enforcement also applies to attempts to enforce a lien obtained before bankruptcy by
attachment, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable means. Enforcement of any judgment
against the debtor is also enjoined.
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damages9 or, in some instances, special remedies. " There is an
ever-present possibility that indebtedness incurred after the filing of a
petition will be granted security and priority ahead of prefiling obliga-
tions."1 Some prefiling obligations may be equitably subordinated to
other similar claims 1 2 or disallowed entirely.13 Further, a secured
party may be compelled to turn over collateral to the estate, 1 4 and such
collateral may be used, sold or leased' s notwithstanding a provision to
the contrary contained in the security agreement. ' 6 A creditor's right of
setoff may also be limited in bankruptcy.' 7 Finally, the claims of
general creditors to dividends, for example, will be subordinated to
priority claims 8 and the debtor will usually be released from liability
on all its dischargeable debts. ' 9 In each of these instances, the Bank-
ruptcy Code has a direct effect on the enforceability of the original
agreement, and the insertion of the bankruptcy out in the enforceabil-
ity opinion apprises the client of the limitation on its scope and
9. Id. § 365. Under this section, the trustee is given the right to assume or reject executory
contracts. The definition of an executory contract for the purpose of the section is not found in the
Code, but the term generally includes all contracts under which acts remain to be performed by
both parties. See generally Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy (pt. 1), 57 Minn. L.
Rev. 439 (1973). A claim arising from such a rejection may be filed, usually as a general claim. 11
U.S.C. § 365(g) (Supp. II app. 1978). Of course, executory contracts may sometimes be assumed
by the trustee notwithstanding a termination clause based on the financial condition of the debtor
or designed to take effect on bankruptcy or insolvency. Id. § 365(b)12).
10. If the debtor is a landlord under a rejected lease of real property the lessee may remain in
possession of the premises in lieu of a claim for damages. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (Supp. II app. 1978).
If the debtor is a vendor under a rejected land sale contract and the vendee is in possession, the
vendee may remain in possession in lieu of damages. Id. § 365(h)(2).
11. Id. § 364.
12. Id. § 510(c).
13. Id. § 5020).
14. Id. § 542(a), (b).
15. Id. § 363.
16. Id. § 363(f), (1).
17. Id. §§ 362(a)(7), 553.
18. Before any dividends are payable to general unsecured creditors, id. § 726, certain debts
are entitled to full payment out of the estate in the order specified in § 507(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Id. § 507(a). The priority items are, for the most part, expenses incurred by the debtor and
others as a consequence of the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. § 503. The first priority consists of all
the costs and expenses of recovering property for, and preserving, the estate, fees for the debtor's
lawyer, and fees for the lawyers, accountants, and appraisers retained by the petitioning creditors
in involuntary proceedings. The reasonable costs and expenses incurred by creditors in success-
fully opposing the debtor's discharge are also covered. The remaining priority items pertain to
favored creditors, including wage claimants, consumer creditors, and tax claimants.
19. The ultimate impact of a bankruptcy proceeding, of course, is the discharge which is
granted the debtor in an order declaring that any judgment theretofore or thereafter obtained in
any court is null and void as a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to
debts discharged under §§ 727, 944, 1141, or 1328(b) of the Code, Id. § 523(a). Certain debts of
individual debtors are nondischargeable under the section, including debts incurred by fraudulent
means, and support and alimony debts. Id.
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insulates the lawyer from liability if the agreement should eventually
prove unenforceable. 20
It is less clear, however, whether the bankruptcy out also excludes
from the scope of the enforceability opinion the potential impact of the
rights and avoiding powers of the trustee in bankruptcy. On the one
hand, the bankruptcy out would seem to have precisely this effect,
because the trustee derives his rights and powers from the Bankruptcy
Code, and the bankruptcy out excludes from the enforceability opinion
all cases in which enforceability is "limited by bankruptcy." On the
other hand, the bankruptcy out may not always accomplish this result
because the trustee's rights and powers under the Code are often
identical to, or substantially the same as. the prebankruptcy rights of
the debtor or his creditors under state or federal nonbankruptcy law.
When the trustee successfully attacks an agreement in reliance on one
of these rights and powers, a court might decide that it was nonbank-
ruptcy law that limited enforceability. In such a case the bank-
20. There is some uncertainty as to the scope of an attorney's liability in connection with a
legal opinion. "It is frequently said that an opinion is only an opinion, not an insurance policy,
and it is true that a lawyer is generally liable only for negligence." Fuld, supra note 2, at 918
(footnote omitted). For example, attorneys have frequently been held liable to clients on opinions
as to the marketability of title based upon a faulty title search. See, e.g., Gleason v. Title
Guarantee Co., 300 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1962); Bayerl v. Smith, 117 NJ.L. 412, 189 A. 93 (1937);
Byrnes v. Palmer, 18 A.D. 1, 45 N.Y.S. 479 (1897), aft'd, 160 N.Y. 699, 55 N.E. 1093 (1899).
Traditionally, however, a lawyer's liability for such negligence has not extended to third parties
who, unlike the client, are not in privity. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1897); cf.
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (parties not in privity cannot
recover for the negligence of a public accountant). Nevertheless, the typical third party legal
opinion, which is delivered to the third party at the request of the client, is more analogous to
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922), in which a public weigher, who
delivered a weight certificate to a buyer at the request of the seller, was held liable to the buyer
for its inaccuracy, notwithstanding the lack of privity. One lawyer has described the situation as
follows: "You are counsel for the company and you are going to give the opinion at the company's
request to the lender. In my definition, your client has become the third party. I think it is pretty
clear that your obligations to your client are at least as great as your obligations to the lender to
whom you are rendering the opinion .. " Panel Discussion, Legal Opinions Given in Corporate
Transactions, 33 Bus. Law. 2389, 2422 (1978) (Remarks of John Burlingame). Accordingly, it has
been argued that the liability of attorneys for their opinions should be extended, Note, Public
Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 Notre Dame Law. 588 (1972),
particularly in connection with securities transactions, Freeman, Opinion Letters and Profes-
sionalism, 1973 Duke L.J. 371. Commentators have noted the possibly enlarged scope of a
lawyer's liability in connection with a legal opinion. See Fuld, Lawyers' Standards and Respon-
sibilities in Rendering Opinions, 33 Bus. Law. 1295, 13(9-10 (1978) ("In the hope of avoiding
liability to a class of persons, a lawyer may state that he is limiting his opinion to the addressee
and that only the addressee may rely on the opinion .... I suspect that, as the law develops in the
future, a limitation which is contrary to realistic expectataons would not be upheld."). A recent
California decision refused to dismiss the complaint of a third party who sought damages from a
law firm, alleging that the firm had negligently delivered an erroneous opinion to its client with
the knowledge that it would be used to solicit loans from the plaintiff and other investors. Roberts
v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976).
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ruptcy out, by its terms, would not protect the lawyer who rendered
the enforceability opinion.
The following analysis examines the trustee's panoply of rights and
powers under the new Bankruptcy Code, ranging from those generally
available to the debtor under nonbankruptcy law to those unique to
the bankruptcy context. The impact of each right and power of the
trustee is considered in order to determine whether the bankruptcy out
should exclude that impact from the scope of the enforceability opin-
ion, and language is recommended which may accommodate the
suggested interpretation.
I. TRUSTEE'S POWERS DERIVED FROM NONBANKRUPTCY LAW
A. Trustee Asserting Claims and Defenses Available to the Debtor
The enforceability of an agreement may depend solely on the rights
of the debtor as of the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed. Under
section 541(a) of the Code, for example, the commencement of a
bankruptcy case creates an estate consisting of all the debtor's legal
and equitable interests in property. 21 These interests include the legal
rights of title and possession, as well as choses in action, and the
equitable rights of redemption and specific performance. 22 In addition,
the trustee, as representative of the estate,23 can commence any
lawsuit that the debtor could have instituted prior to the filing of the
petition. 24 Thus, if the debtor had the right to challenge the enforce-
ability of an agreement prior to bankruptcy, the trustee will have the
same right. The Code also affords the trustee the benefit of "any
defense available to the debtor as against an entity other than the
estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes of fraud, and other
personal defenses.125
As a result of section 541(a), the trustee in bankruptcy, rather than
the debtor, can both initiate an action to rescind an agreement and
defend an action to enforce an agreement: the trustee is simply
substituted for the debtor.26 In such situations, enforceability is not
limited by bankruptcy but depends on the rights of the debtor which
21. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)-(a)(1) (Supp. II app. 1978).
22. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1977), reprinted in 119781 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6323-24; S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess, 82-83 (1978),
reprinted in 11978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5868-69.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 323 (Supp. H app. 1978).
24. Id. § 541(a)(1). See generally 4 W. Collier, Bankruptcy 541.10 (15th ed. L. King,
M. Cook, R. D'Agostino & K. Klee 1979).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 541(e) (Supp. I app. 1978). The waiver of any such defense by the debtor
after the commencement of the case does not bind the estate. Id.
26. One slight difference exists when the trustee asserts the claim. The time during which the
debtor must have asserted the claim may be tolled if the claim is brought by the trustee. Id.
§ 108.
1979]
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existed prior to bankruptcy. The bankruptcy out, therefore, should not
be interpreted as excluding these situations from the scope of the
enforceability opinion. A cautious recipient of the opinion, however,
may wish to make clear that the bankruptcy out does not extend to
these situations by requiring that the opinion be modified as follows:
except as such enforceability may be limited by provisions of title 11 of the United
States Code, insolvency laws, or similar laws affecting the rights of creditors generally,
that are not expressly derived from rights that the seller (purchaser) was entitled to
assert absent such title or laws.
This contraction of the bankruptcy exception expands the scope of the
enforceability opinion, thereby giving greater assurance to the recip-
ient. At the same time, the opining lawyer has expressly broadened the
scope of matters which must be considered before rendering his
opinion, exposing himself to a greater potential for liability.
27
B. Trustee Asserting Rights and Powers of Creditors Under State and
Federal Nonbankruptcy Law
The enforceability of an agreement in a bankruptcy proceeding may
depend on rights enjoyed under state or federal nonbankruptcy law by
a creditor of a debtor. Under section 544(b) of the Code, a trustee is
empowered to avoid any transfer of property or any obligation of the
debtor that is voidable for any reason by an actual unsecured creditor
under any applicable nonbankruptcy law. 28 The claim of the actual
unsecured creditor must be one which is allowable under the Code. 29
As in the case of the prebankruptcy rights of the debtor, this section
appears, at least initially, to create a situation which the bankruptcy
out should not exclude from the scope of the enforceability opinion,
because the powers conferred on the trustee by section 544(b) are
derived from nonbankruptcy law rather than from the Code. The
trustee assumes the role of an actual creditor of the debtor, instead of
standing in the shoes of the debtor. The dependence of the trustee's
rights on the existence of an actual unsecured creditor suggests that the
bankruptcy out should not exclude the potential impact of the exercise
of those rights on enforceability. The attorney drafting the enforce-
ability opinion can reasonably be expected to have considered the rights
of a party's creditors under the applicable state and federal nonbank-
ruptcy law.
Nevertheless, the operation of the rule of Moore v. Bay 30 may have
27. "[Tjhe more the lawyer is willing to commit himself, the more he facilitates a transaction
for his client, but of course the more the lawyer exposes himself." Fuld, supra note 2, at 918.
28. These powers "enable the trustee to marshal or increase the potential assets of the estate."
4 W. Collier, supra note 24, 1 544.01 at 544-2.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. II app. 1978).
30. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
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devastating consequences if the bankruptcy out does not exclude the
impact of an actual unsecured creditor's rights on enforceability. In
Moore v. Bay, the Supreme Court construed section 70e of the
Bankruptcy Act, 31 from which section 544(b) of the new Code is
derived, to permit the trustee to assert the rights of a single creditor on
behalf of the entire estate. 32 Section 544(b) continues this principle to
the extent of allowing the trustee to assert one unsecured creditor's
rights on behalf of the entire estate. In addition, the rule has the effect
of allowing the trustee to stand in the shoes of a creditor who has a
relatively small claim and to exercise his power to avoid the transfer in
its entirety, not merely to the extent of the creditor's claim.
The consequences of this power become apparent in a transaction
involving the transfer of substantially all the assets of a retail or
wholesale merchant. Assume, for example, that the buyer of the assets
waives compliance with the bulk sales article of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code,33 which might not seem unreasonable if arrangements
had been made to assure that the seller's creditors are paid. If all but
one of the seller's creditors are paid and, following the transaction, the
seller invests the proceeds of the sale in a new business which fails,
leaving new creditors and forcing the seller into bankruptcy, a trustee
who is able to locate the lone unpaid creditor may set aside the entire
bulk sale for the benefit of the estate. This would be true even if the
claim of the original unpaid creditor were miniscule in amount, and
even though all the other claims were subsequent to the bulk sale,
having arisen upon the failure of the second business. 34
Absent bankruptcy, the lawyer who rendered an enforceability
opinion which neglected to consider the bulk sales requirements would
be liable only to the extent of the claim of the single creditor who was
overlooked and not paid. Under Moore v. Bay, however, the impact of
the lawyer's negligence is compounded by the party's bankruptcy,
resulting in the avoidance of the entire transaction. This drastic result
ought to be excluded from the scope of the enforceability opinion by
the bankruptcy out. To accomplish this result, the bankruptcy out
might be modified in the following way:
31. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 70, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
32. 284 U.S. at S.
33. U.C.C. art. 6. Sections 6-104, 6-105, and 6-107 of the U.C.C. generally provide that
unless the transferor gives notice to his creditors in the required manner, and submits a list of
those creditors to the transferee, a bulk transfer is ineffective against the transferor's creditors.
34. A second example of the trustee's power under § 544(b) involves the sale of personal
property which requires a change of possession to complete the transfer. Under Cal. Civ. Code
§ 3440 (West 1970), if such a sale is not accompanied by a change of possession, the property remains
subject to the claims of the creditors of the transferor. Accordingly, the trustee would have the
power to invalidate the prior transfer of any such personal property which remains in the
possession of the debtor on the date of bankruptcy. The intended transferee would have no
recourse other than to file a claim as a general unsecured creditor for consideration which had
been transferred to the debtor in exchange for such property.
1979]
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except as such enforceability may be limited by provisions of title 11 of the United
States Code, insolvency laws, or similar laws affecting the rights of creditors generally
that (i) are not expressly derived from and (ii) do not have substantially the same effect
as, the rights that the seller (purchaser) or any creditor of the seller (purchaser) was
entitled to assert absent such title or laws.
Such a provision would insulate the opining lawyer from the untoward
effects of section 544(b) and Moore v. Bay by excluding from the scope
of the opinion any limitation on enforceability that has an effect which
is not substantially the same as the effect of rights that any unsecured
creditor was entitled to assert absent bankruptcy. The "magnifying"
effect of Moore v. Bay, therefore, is specifically excluded by the
narrowed enforceability opinion.
II. TRUSTEE'S POWERS WHICH ARE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME
AS RIGHTS UNDER THE NONBANKRUPTCY LAW
A. The Trustee's Right to Avoid Fraudulent Transfers
The enforceability of an agreement may depend on rights which are
substantially the same as those vested in creditors under the state
fraudulent conveyance statute. Under section 548(a) of the Code, every
transfer made 35 within one year immediately prior to bankruptcy is
fraudulent as to creditors if made or incurred: (1) with actual intent 36
to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor; or (2) without receipt of a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obliga-
tion 37 if the debtor (a) is, or will thereby be rendered, insolvent, 38 or
(b) is engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction for
which the remaining capital is unreasonably small, 39 or (c) intended to,
or believed that he would, incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they
mature. 4
0
The trustee may avoid a transfer made or an obligation incurred
35. "[A] transfer is made when such transfer becomes so far perfected that a bona fide
purchaser from the debtor against whom such transfer could have been perfected cannot acquire an
interest in the property transferred that is superior to the interest in such property of the
transferee, but if such transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of the case, such
transfer occurs immediately before the date of the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(I)
(Supp. I1 app. 1978).
36. Section 548(a)(1) requires "actual intent" to defraud, as distinguished from intent pre-
sumed in law.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (Supp. II app. 1978).
38. Section 548(a)(2)(B)(i) applies without regard to the debtor's actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors. "Insolvent" is generally defined as the "financial condition such that the sum
of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation. ... "d,
§ 101(26).
39. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii).
40. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii).
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that is fraudulent under section 548(a).41 This power is similar to that
available to creditors under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA),42 adopted in many states. 43 In fact, pursuant to section
544(b) of the Code, the trustee may elect to proceed under the state's
fraudulent conveyance law if it affords a longer statute of limitations
or if the transfer was not in good faith. 4 4
The Code does not substantially alter nonbankruptcy law in this
situation. Whether the trustee relies on section 548(a) of the Code, or,
alternatively, on section 544(b) and the state fraudulent conveyance
statute, the effect is the same. Moore v. Bay allows the trustee to avoid
the transfer for the benefit of both creditors who exist at the time of the
transfer and future creditors. Under nonbankruptcy law, the UFCA
generally allows the transfer to be avoided for the benefit of then-
existing and future creditors. 45
In one instance, however, the UFCA standard varies from that of
the Bankruptcy Code. A conveyance by an insolvent is deemed
fraudulent under the UFCA only as .to then-existing creditors. 46 In
practical terms, this means that such a fraudulent conveyance could
only be set aside for the benefit of creditors who had extended credit at
the time of the conveyance. Under the Code, however, the trustee may
rely either on section 548(a)(2) or the combination of section 544(b) and
Moore v. Bay in order to set aside the conveyance for the benefit of all
creditors, even those "future" creditors who extended credit after the
fraudulent transfer. 4 7 Effectively, the trustee is able to set aside the
conveyance of an insolvent even if no creditors existed at the time of
the transfer, as long as a future creditor exists. A future creditor
relying solely on the state fraudulent conveyance statute would have
no such power.
Accordingly, the bankruptcy out should exclude from the scope of
the enforceability opinion situations in which a transaction is avoided
because of the debtor's insolvency, under either section 548(a)(2) or
section 544(b) and state law. At the same time, the previous analysis
41. A transferee who takes for value and in good faith has a lien to the extent of value given
in exchange for the transfer. Id. § 548(c).
42. See Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act §§ 4-8. The provisions of the UFCA generally
correspond to the provisions of § 548(a). Thus, Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 4 deals
with conveyances by an insolvent, § 5 with conveyances by those in business, § 6 with
conveyances of those about to incur debts, and § 8 with conveyances made with actual intent to
defraud.
43. Twenty-three states have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. See 7A
Uniform Laws Annotated 161 (1978), Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Table of Jurisdictions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. IU app. 1978).
45. See Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act §§ 5-8.
46. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 4.
47. See 4 W. Collier, supra note 24, T 548.03 at 548-44.
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suggests that if a transaction is set aside under any of the other
provisions of section 548 or of the UFCA-those not involving the
debtor's insolvency-the bankruptcy out should not be interpreted to
exclude from the opinion the potential effect of avoidance. Under these
latter provisions, the trustee's powers, and the amount which he is able
to recover for the estate, will be substantially the same as that of
creditors who could bring actions under state law in the absence of
bankruptcy.
If the recipient of the enforceability opinion desires to modify the
bankruptcy out so as to conform to this interpretation, the following
language is suggested:
except as such enforceability may be limited by provisions of title 11 of the United
States Code, insolvency laws, or similar laws affecting the rights of creditors generally,
that (i) are neither expressly derived from nor substantially identical to, and (ii) do not
have substantially the same effect as, the rights that the seller (purchaser) or any
creditor of the seller (purchaser) was entitled to assert absent such title or laws.
B. The Trustee as a Hypothetical Lien Creditor and Purchaser
The enforceability of an agreement may turn on rights which a
hypothetical lien creditor or bona fide purchaser could have asserted
on the date of bankruptcy. Under section 544(a)(1), the trustee has the
status of a hypothetical lien creditor who, on the date of bankruptcy,
extends credit and obtains a judicial lien on all property of the debtor
on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained a lien. 48
Section 544(a)(1) probably has its greatest impact in the situation where
a security interest in personal property remains unperfected as of the
date of bankruptcy. Under section 9-301 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of a
person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is
perfected. 49 Because the trustee is granted the status of a "lien credi-
tor" by section 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee is given
the power to invalidate security interests in personal property which
remain unperfected as of the date of bankruptcy. In such a case, the
affected secured creditor would be relegated to the status of a general
unsecured creditor.
Under section 544(a)(3), the trustee enjoys the status of a hypotheti-
cal bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor on the date of
bankruptcy.50 This section is most significant where a deed on real
property remains unrecorded as of the date of bankruptcy. Under the
48. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (Supp. II app. 1978). The trustee also enjoys the status of a
hypothetical creditor who obtains an execution which is unsatisfied. Id. § 544(a)(2).
49. U.C.C. 9-301.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (Supp. II app. 1978).
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law of many states, a bona fide purchaser of real.property prevails
over a grantee holding an unrecorded deed on such property.5
How should the bankruptcy out be interpreted if the trustee invali-
dates a security interest by reason of the hypothetical lien creditor or
the bona fide purchaser status? First, the situation is once removed
from reality since no actual creditor need exist. Second, a Moore v.
Bay problem is once again presented because the trustee may rely on
section 544(a) to set aside a transfer for the benefit of all creditors.
Both factors suggest that the bankruptcy out ought to exclude the
impact of section 544(a) from the scope of the enforceability opinion.
Nevertheless, since the trustee's rights depend on whether a security
interest has been properly perfected under state law, the relevant
issue is to determine who was responsible for the task. If the enforce-
ability opinion specifically advised that the security interest had been
perfected, counsel might reasonably be held accountable for the
foreseeable consequences of the erroneous opinion-including loss of
the security interest in bankruptcy-and the bankruptcy out should
not be interpreted to exclude such an impact. On the other hand, if
the enforceability opinion identified the appropriate steps required to
perfect the security interest and stated that perfection was the respon-
sibility of the recipient of the opinion, the opposite conclusion should
follow. If the perfection problem were simply overlooked, counsel
should not be permitted to rely on the bankruptcy out in any case in
which counsel could have prevented the result and the perfection of the
security interest was central to the transaction.
Absent a situation in which responsibility for the error on which the
trustee relied rests with counsel, the bankruptcy out should be ad-
justed to clearly exclude the impact of section 544(a) from the scope of
the enforceability opinion. This exclusion may be accomplished by the
addition of the word "actual" to modify "creditor," as in the following
example:
except as such enforceability may be limited by provisions of title 11 of the United
States Code, insolvency laws, and similar laws affecting the rights of creditors
generally, that (i) are neither expressly derived from nor substantially identical to, and
(ii) do not have substantially the same effect as, the rights that the seller (purchaser) or
any actual creditor of the seller (purchaser) was entitled to assert absent such title or
laws.
1Il. TRUSTEE'S POWERS UNIQUE TO BANKRUPTCY
A. The Trustee's Right to Ignore Forfeiture Clauses
The Bankruptcy Code limits the enforceability of a forfeiture clause:
that is, a provision in an agreement which would modify or terminate
51. See 6 R. Powell, Real Property 913 (P. Rohan ed. 1979).
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the agreement upon insolvency or a change in the financial condition of
a party, the commencement of a case under the Code, o- the appoint-
ment of a receiver, trustee, or custodian. Section 541(c) requires that
the property of the debtor pass to the estate notwithstanding a forfei-
ture clause or other provision that restricts the transfer of property.52
Once the debtor's property becomes property of the estate, section 363(1)
permits the trustee to use, sell, or lease the property notwithstanding a
forfeiture clause to the contrary.5 3 Under section 365(e) a forfeiture
clause cannot be used to terminate or modify an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, with certain exceptions. S4 Further, a
forfeiture clause cannot prevent the trustee from assuming-5 or assign-
ing5 6 most kinds of executory contracts and unexpired leases."7 The
bankruptcy out should be interpreted to exclude the application of
these sections from the scope of the opinion, because these sections
restrict forfeiture clauses only during bankruptcy. 8
B. The Trustee's Right to Avoid Preferential Transfers
The enforceability of an agreement in bankruptcy may depend on
whether the transaction involved a preferential transfer.
A preference is defined in part as a transfer of property of the
debtor, to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on account of an
antecedent debt of the debtor, made while the debtor was insolvent
and within ninety days of bankruptcy, that enables such creditor to
receive more than the creditor would receive in a liquidation case had
the transfer not been made. 59 In addition, if the creditor is an "insider"
and has reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent, the
ninety-day period is extended to one year prior to bankruptcy. 60 The
trustee may avoid preferential transfers, subject to certain excep-
tions. 6 1
52. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) (Supp. II app. 1978).
53. Id. § 363(1).
54. Id. § 365(e). The section states that the limitation on forfeiture clauses does not apply to
contracts to make loans or extend other debt financial accommodations to or for the benefit of tile
debtor, or a contract to issue a security of the debtor. In addition, forfeiture clauses remain
effective with respect to contracts where applicable law excuses the nonbankrupt party from
rendering performance to or accepting performance from the trustee. This would probably
include some kinds of personal service contracts. Id. § 365(e)(2).
55. Id. § 365(b)(2).
56. Id. § 365(0.
57. The trustee may not assume or assign the contracts discussed in note 54 supra. Id.
§ 365(c).
58. Since a forfeiture clause may be enforced only under extremely limited circumstances, the
opining lawyer would be wise to consider such a clause carefully when passing on the "validity"
of the agreement in his opinion. The considerations involved are, however, beyond the scope of
this article.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. Hl app. 1978).
60. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B)(i)-(ii).
61. Id. § 547(c).
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In the typical transaction involving the transfer of property for a
present consideration there will be no risk of a preferential transfer
because no antecedent debt is involved. Consider, for example, the
case in which real and personal property is sold pursuant to an
agreement under which the seller receives a down payment and a
secured promissory note representing the balance of the purchase
price. In such a situation the cash down payment and promissory note
are delivered at the closing in exchange for a deed to the real property
and a bill of sale covering the personal property. In addition, the
security interest of the seller is usually evidenced by a deed of trust as
to the real property and a security agreement as to the personal
property.
In this example, property of both the seller and the buyer is being
transferred contemporaneously. The seller transfers the real and per-
sonal property, and the buyer transfers the cash down payment, the
promissory note, and the security interest granted to the seller in the
real and personal property. 62 None of these transfers constitutes a
preference because, even if consummated on the eve of the seller's or
the buyer's bankruptcy, the transfers are for a new and contemporane-
ous consideration.
Thus, the typical sale does not involve a preferential transfer when
all the appropriate procedures are followed in consummating the
transaction. A misstep in this area, however, may be fatal because of
the provisions of section 547(e) of the Code. 6 3
Section 547(e) defines when a transfer of property is perfected and
deemed to have been made for the purposes of section 547 of the Code.
In the case of real property other than fixtures, a transfer is deemed to
be perfected when "a bona fide purchaser ... from the debtor against
whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot
acquire an interest [in such property] superior to the interest of the
transferee. '64 In the case of fixtures or personal property, a transfer is
deemed to be perfected when no creditor on a simple contract can
acquire a judicial lien superior to the interest of the transferee. 6 5 These
tests are applicable regardless of whether there actually are or were
creditors who might have obtained liens or become bona fide pur-
chasers. A transfer is made at the time it takes effect between the
debtor and transferee if perfected at or within ten days after such time.
Otherwise the transfer is made when perfected or at the commence-
ment of the case, whichever is earlier. A transfer is never made,
however, until the debtor has rights in the property transferred.
62. "Transfer" is defined to include the retention of title as a security interest. Id. § 101(40).
63. Id. § 547(e).
64. Id. § 547(e)(1)(A).
65. Id. § 547(e)(1)(B).
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The impact of section 547(e) is aptly illustrated if it is assumed that,
through an inadvertance such as the improper filing of a financing
statement, a seller's security interest in personal property is not prop-
erly perfected at the time of closing. Assume also that a year passes
before the error is rectified and that the buyer files a petition under the
Code within the ninety-day period following perfection of the security
interest. In this case, even though the buyer's bankruptcy occurs more
than a year after the actual transaction, the transfer of the buyer's
property (the granting of the security interest in favor of the seller) will
be deemed to have been made within ninety days of bankruptcy. In
addition, the transfer will be treated as if it were for an antecedent
debt because of the substantial period of time between the creation of
the original obligation and the subsequent perfection of the security
interest. If the other elements of a preference are present, the trustee
would be able to successfully avoid the security interest.
How should the bankruptcy out be interpreted where a preference
results because of the failure to perfect a security interest? Two factors
point toward interpreting the bankruptcy out as excluding the effect
of a preference from the scope of the enforceability opinion. First, the
preference section of the Code has no counterpart in the laws of most
states. Second, a Moore v. Bay kind of problem is presented. Absent
bankruptcy, the secured party would merely be subordinate to credi-
tors who obtained their liens prior to perfection. In bankruptcy, the
security interest is invalidated in its entirety as to all creditors.
Outweighing these considerations, however, is the fact that the
critical issue is one which is determined by state nonbankruptcy
law-did the seller perfect the security interest? Because the failure to
comply with state law regarding perfection creates the preference, the
crucial question is whether counsel rendering the enforceability opinion
or its recipient had the responsibility for this failure. If the recipient
had responsibility, the bankruptcy out should exclude the effect of
section 547 from the scope of the enforceability opinion. If counsel had
responsibility, the bankruptcy out, as formulated above, clearly does
not exclude the impact of the section.
CONCLUSION
The formulation of an enforceability opinion ought to involve an
analysis of all the elements of a transaction which could bring the
fraudulent conveyance, the preference, or other sections of the Bank-
ruptcy Code into play. In such opinions, the bankruptcy out should be
drafted with care and with consideration of all the possible situations
in which enforceability may be affected by bankruptcy and related
law. Indeed, both the counsel rendering the opinion and the recipient
thereof should make certain that their respective interests are pro-
tected by the bankruptcy out.
